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 It is estimated that over 400,000 embryos are currently cryopreserved in the United 
States, and many of these will never be used by their creators.  Although many options exist for 
the disposition of unwanted embryos, such as donation to research or destruction, one option, 
embryo donation to another individual for implantation, has met with resistance from some 
religious institutions such as the Catholic Church, and remains largely unregulated in American 
law.  This practice, which offers the possibility of life for the embryo and the possibility of 
parenthood for the recipient, should be morally acceptable in the Catholic tradition and properly 
regulated by legislatures. 
This paper argues that the current contract law approach to embryo donation is not 
sufficient to ensure permanence of the agreement, and the practice is not intrinsically unethical 
based on principles of Catholic bioethics.  This thesis proposes that reconceptualizing the 
practice of embryo donation as embryo adoption can resolve both the legal insufficiencies and 
the Catholic ethical concerns.  Approaching embryo donation within an adoption framework 
definitively establishes the allocation of parental rights and provides them with judicial support.  
Viewing the practice as a form of adoption instead of a reproductive technology also avoids a 
violation of Catholic moral principles and establishes embryo donation as an ethical option for 
those wishing to adopt abandoned embryos.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
It is estimated that over 400,000 embryos are currently cryopreserved in the United States.1  
Although 90% are classified as “in use” by the couples that produced them, far fewer of these 
embryos will ever actually be used by those couples.2  When I first heard these statistics in a 
college course that taught Catholic reproductive ethics, I was told that according to current 
Catholic doctrine, despite the high number of frozen abandoned embryos, there were no ethically 
permissible options for implanting, disposing, or otherwise taking them out of their 
cryopreserved state.  Not satisfied with that answer, I made it a priority to use my education in 
bioethics, law and theology to solve the puzzle.  What should a pluralistic society consider when 
determining the proper disposition of abandoned embryos? 
This question exists, in part, because of the ongoing public debate regarding personhood 
and the beginning of life, as well as the nature of the IVF process, which often results in a large 
number of excess embryos.  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine has issued 
guidelines for the practice of IVF that call for the transfer of one to five embryos per cycle, 
depending on the woman’s age and prognosis.3  Since up to 20 eggs can be extracted during egg 
retrieval surgery, and clinicians fertilize as many of them as possible, often more of these eggs 
                                                
1 See Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard Weaver, “Introduction: The Ethics of Embryo 
Adoption and the Catholic Tradition,” in The Ethics of Embryo Adoption and the Catholic Tradition: 
Moral Arguments, Economic Reality and Social Analysis, eds. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene 
Fozard Weaver (Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2007), 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 American Society for Reproductive Medicine, “Guidelines on Number of Embryos 
Transferred,” Fertility and Sterility 92, no. 5 (November 2009): 1518-19. 
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are fertilized than will be implanted in one cycle.4  For those who contracted to have the embryos 
created, several options exist for the remaining embryos.  These spare embryos may be kept for 
future use by those who commissioned the embryos, destroyed, donated for research purposes, or 
donated to other people who wish to implant, gestate and raise a child as their own.  For many of 
those who believe that life begins at conception, the high number of unwanted frozen embryos is 
ethically unsettling, and they would embrace scientific and regulatory options that avoid the 
destruction of embryos.  Currently in the United States, however, there is no settled opinion on 
the donation of embryos to others who wish to have a child, and no consistent regulations exist to 
define and oversee the process. 
 In the search for an ethical solution to the problem of unwanted embryos, there are at 
least two prominent social institutions that may provide insight on a resolution: the American 
legal system and the Roman Catholic Church.  Lawmakers are in a position to craft regulations 
on reproductive technologies that may, in turn, shape public perception of the issue.  So far, 
many states have drawn on contract and property law to govern the practice of embryo donation, 
but these frameworks may not afford a realistic long-term solution to such regulation.  The 
Catholic Church, which has long been a prominent voice in bioethical debates, is struggling to 
determine its own teaching on embryo donation because the Church has deemed illicit many of 
the proposed solutions to the surplus of frozen embryos. 
   To provide clarity within this discussion, and because there is no consistent language or 
terminology used to describe many aspects of reproductive technologies, it is necessary to 
provide a definition of terms.  Most importantly, while certain rights of personhood can be 
artificially bestowed on an entity by statute, as with corporations, for purposes of this project, the 
                                                
4 Brakman and Weaver, 4 
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legal status of “personhood” refers to the rights currently conferred on natural persons born in 
the United States.  The term embryo will be used to describe a fertilized egg from the moment of 
conception through the 8th week of gestation, which includes the stage at which it may be 
cryogenically preserved outside of the uterus.  For purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the 
adopting couple is heterosexual and married to minimize complications in the development of 
the argument for embryo adoption.  Furthermore, because it is possible that the embryos are the 
genetic product of either the couple themselves or donor gametes, the couple that commissioned 
the creation of the embryos will be referred to as custodians.5  The woman who carries the 
embryo will be referred to as the gestational mother, while the man and woman who intend to 
parent the child will be referred to as the intended parents.  In many cases in the use of 
reproductive technologies, the gestational and intended mother will be the same individual.  
Those who contributed gametes to an embryo will be called genetic parents; the term parent is 
used in this case to connote genetic parenthood, but not social parenthood, and is not intended to 
imply the personhood of an embryo. 
Chapter one addresses the current contract-based approach to embryo donation under 
current legal regulations and argues that this approach is not sufficient to effect the permanent 
transfer of parental rights necessary for the practice.  Chapter two examines the arguments both 
for and against embryo donation posed within the Catholic bioethical tradition, and demonstrates 
how embryo donation may fit within the ethical framework of the Church.  Finally, chapter three 
argues that approaching this practice as embryo adoption will satisfy the legal insufficiencies of 
contract law and provide a basis for moral permissibility within Catholic teaching.  It is through 
an analogy to the current adoption framework that this particular option for the disposition of 
                                                
5 Custodian legally refers to a person that has custody of either a child or property, and is not 
meant to imply that the embryo is a child. Black’s Law Dictionary 9th ed. 
 4 
unwanted frozen embryos can be both permissible and properly regulated, ensuring the 
protection of the interests of those wishing to donate or adopt one of these embryos.
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II. CONTRACT LAW AND THE EMBRYO 
 
 
 
 
In the United States, an embryo or fetus does not have the status of a person under the United 
States Constitution until the moment of birth.  Decades of reproductive rights cases have 
established that although an embryo or fetus in utero is not a person, the state still has an interest 
in protecting that “potential life” in later stages of the pregnancy and may enact laws and 
regulations that protect this interest as long as they do not impose an undue burden on a woman 
seeking an abortion.6 
 
 
 
A. HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
 
 
The 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade held that abortion falls under a woman’s 
Constitutionally protected right to privacy, and is therefore a legal practice.7  The Supreme Court 
based this decision on the conclusion that a fetus is not a person entitled to legal rights; however, 
this conclusion was qualified by the Court’s recognition of a growing state interest in the 
“potential life” of the fetus as the pregnancy progresses.8  In this case, the state argued that the 
fetus was a person entitled to Constitutional protection, while the petitioner contended that 
abortion is an issue of bodily privacy, over which the state should have little control.9  Although 
                                                
6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
7 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8 Ibid., 164-66. 
9 Ibid., 162-64. 
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the Court found that the fetus is not legally a person, it attempted to reconcile the competing 
interests of the state and the woman seeking an abortion by establishing a sliding scale of state 
control based on pregnancy trimesters.10  Although this trimester system was discarded by the 
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992, the central ruling, which survived Casey, is that 
the state may only place restrictions on access to abortion that are proportionate to the growing 
interest in the fetal life.11 
In Casey, the Court determined that trimesters were no longer useful to determine the 
guideline for the degree of state interference that should be allowed with those seeking an 
abortion because medico-scientific advances made it possible for fetal viability, the ability of a 
fetus to survive outside of the womb, to be achieved earlier than the start of the third trimester.12  
Maintaining its position that the state has an increasing interest in the “potential life” of the fetus 
even though rights associated with personhood are not conferred until birth, the Court 
determined that a better test for appropriate state restrictions on access to abortion was the 
“undue burden” test, which allows for regulations that restrict or otherwise affect abortions as 
long as they do not impose an undue burden on the woman seeking an abortion.13  Regulations 
are considered to present an undue burden if they have “the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”14  Just as 
the Court in Roe recognized the highest state interest in fetal life in the third trimester, the Casey 
Court recognized a more expansive state interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy, 
but most of all after viability.15 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Roe v. Wade, 165-66. 
12 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 860. 
13 Ibid., 873-74. 
14 Ibid., 877. 
15 Ibid., 879. 
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B. FETAL PERSONHOOD IN THE LAW 
 
 
The abortion cases before the Supreme Court have conferred immunity from prosecution on a 
physician who terminates the life of a fetus with the consent of the pregnant woman within 
certain regulatory limitations.  Although the fetus does not have the permanent legal status of a 
person, as those who are born do, state laws sometimes treat the fetus as a person for certain 
limited purposes, conferring upon it certain rights and protections usually reserved for born 
human beings.  The California Penal Code, for example, defines murder as “the unlawful killing 
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”16  This statute provides explicit 
exceptions for abortions to which the woman consents, but otherwise does not qualify the 
definition of the crime.  While the fetus is not included in the definition of a person, it is 
nevertheless treated as a person for purposes of prosecuting an individual for murder in contexts 
other than abortion. 
 Minnesota’s penal code contains a separate crime entitled “murder of unborn child in the 
first degree.”17  This crime carries with it the punishment of imprisonment for life if the 
defendant is convicted of “caus[ing] the death of an unborn child with premeditation and with 
intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another,” as well as causing the death of the 
unborn child in the course of committing criminal sexual conduct or other crimes of aggression.18  
The explanatory notes in this statute explain that this crime is not void for vagueness for failing 
                                                
16 West’s Annotated California Penal Code, sec. 187 (2008). 
17 Minnesota Annotated Statutes, sec. 609.2661 (2010). 
18 Minnesota Annotated Statutes, sec. 609.2661 (2010).  A defendant is “guilty of murder of an 
unborn child in the first degree…[if he or she] causes the death of an unborn child…while committing or 
attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, 
tampering with a witness in the first degree, or escape from custody.” 
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to distinguish between a viable fetus and a non-viable embryo or fetus.19  Both are protected 
under this statute. 
 In Idaho, the crime of aggravated battery includes an act of battery “Upon the person of a 
pregnant female, [which] causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent 
disfigurement to an embryo or fetus.”20  Although this section provides an explicit exclusion for 
authorized abortions, if another person injures the embryo or fetus without the woman’s consent, 
that person is subject to the same prosecution as for a crime against a born person.21  Likewise, 
Mississippi specifies that the term “human being” includes an “unborn child” from conception 
until birth with respect to several criminal offenses, such as capital murder and homicide while 
committing a felony, explicitly excluding legal abortions.22  
 
 
 
C. LEGAL DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS 
 
 
The cases establishing reproductive rights provide the backdrop for current legal challenges 
regarding reproductive technologies, such as determining dispositions of embryos when the 
custodians disagree or the question of parental rights in gestational surrogacy arrangements.  
While the legal system does not confer full personhood and Constitutional protection on a fetus 
until it is born, it does recognize a heightened state interest in the developing fetus.  While this 
thesis does not address the question of when human life and personhood begin, it is important to 
understand the role of this debate as well as the current legal landscape in reproductive rights on 
the issue of disposition of frozen embryos.   
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Idaho Code Statutes Annotated, sec. 18-907 (2011). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Mississippi Laws, sec. 97-3-37 (West 2011). 
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The non-person status of a fetus has been uniformly applied to cases involving many 
reproductive technologies with little difficulty.  However, in the case of embryo donation, where 
the human embryo is no longer the subject inside of a woman’s body, but a separately existing 
entity, the traditional person/non-person delineation – depending as it does on a woman’s bodily 
privacy – has broken down.  Unlike abortion, which relies heavily on the interest of the pregnant 
woman, embryo adoption eliminates this competing factor.  Here, courts struggle to determine 
the correct legal analysis to apply to transfers of or disputes over cryopreserved embryos 
because, although it is clear that the embryo is not a legal person, it is not as clear that the 
embryo has the legal status of property. 
Courts have applied three different approaches to disputes over the disposition of 
embryos in divorce to determine the legal status of the embryo and, consequently, the rights of 
the custodians and the protections accorded to the embryo: the constitutional rights approach, the 
contract approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.  Although each approach 
addresses some of the important considerations arising in these kinds of disputes, none of them 
comprehensively considers all of the interests involved.  These varied and inconsistently applied 
approaches create confusion not only for custodians of embryos, but also for courts responsible 
for resolving these disputes.  If certainty of custody of embryos in divorce is unsettled and 
unpredictable, using the same approaches for embryo donation may create similar or greater 
uncertainty about the rightful custodian of embryos and the resulting children when third parties 
with competing claims are involved. 
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1. Constitutional Rights Approach 
 
 
An explanation of the legal confusion over the status of a cryopreserved embryo is found in 
Davis v. Davis, a 1992 case involving a dispute over embryos belonging to a divorcing couple.23  
When Junior and Mary Sue Davis agreed to undergo IVF with their own gametes, they did not 
sign an agreement beforehand indicating what should happen to any spare embryos they might 
have if they divorced.24  When their marriage ended with seven embryos still in storage, Mary 
Sue wished to donate the embryos to another couple, while Junior asked that they be discarded.25  
The Tennessee Supreme Court, operating without legislative guidance or an agreement signed by 
the parties, crafted and applied a balancing test that considered Constitutional rights traditionally 
recognized in other areas of reproductive law, as well as “the significance of [the parties’] 
interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.”26   
The Tennessee Court identified the specific individual freedom as an issue of procreative 
autonomy.27  According to the court, this right to procreational autonomy is composed of two 
rights: the positive right to procreate and the negative right to avoid procreation, each equal in 
their significance.28  The Tennessee Court reached this conclusion by reviewing reproductive 
privacy cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, which established the affirmative right to procreate 
as a fundamental civil right.29  Eisenstadt v. Baird clarified procreational autonomy as “the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
                                                
23 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
24 Ibid., 592. 
25 Ibid., 590. 
26 Ibid., 603. 
27 Ibid., 600-601. 
28 Davis v. Davis, 601. 
29 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”30  
The Tennessee court also briefly examined the state interest in “potential life” that can justify 
certain intrusions into this procreational right, but concluded that such an interest is not 
significant enough in cases of embryo disposition.31   
In its analysis, the court explored the potential consequences of both donation and 
destruction for each party.  Junior testified that he suffered as a child of divorced parents, seeing 
his mother only monthly and his father only a few times before he died.32  Due to his difficult 
childhood, Junior was “vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both 
parents.”33  He was largely concerned not only with the psychological effects he would face 
knowing that he was a genetic parent to a child he might never meet, but also the potential that 
the child would be left in a single-parent household if the recipient couple divorced.34 
Mary Sue, on the other hand, claimed that destruction of the embryos would leave her 
with the “burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile,” and 
those embryos she helped to create would never develop into children.35  The court, recognizing 
that this burden was not insignificant, nevertheless translated these potential burdens into the 
conclusion that Mary Sue’s right to “procreate” through donation was not substantial enough to 
overcome Junior’s desire to avoid becoming a genetic parent.  There was no clear test applied to 
determine which right of procreational autonomy should prevail; the court simply engaged in a 
subjective balancing test based on these potential effects on the parties.  The court further 
                                                
30 Davis v. Davis, 600, quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in 
original). 
31 Ibid., 602-03. 
32 Ibid., 603-04. 
33 Ibid., 604. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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emphasized, “Donation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice – his procreational autonomy 
would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited.”36 
Although not part of the final holding, the court suggests that Mary Sue may have had a 
greater interest if she was asking to implant the embryos either in herself or a surrogate, giving 
her custody of any resulting children.37  If this were the case, the court would have taken into 
account several factors, including whether she would have a reasonable opportunity to undergo 
IVF again and whether she would consider adoption as an alternative to genetic parenthood.38   
The court concluded by articulating a three-part test to be used as a judicial guide for 
determining how to resolve disputes over embryos.39  First, the preferences of the progenitors 
should control the disposition.  However, if they cannot agree, courts should then look to any 
prior agreement signed by both parties that governs the disposition of frozen embryos in divorce.  
If no such contract exists, the court should weigh the interests of either party in using or not 
using the embryos in question.  In this balancing test, the party wishing to avoid procreation 
should prevail on the assumption that the other party can demonstrate that he or she does not 
have a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by any other means, because the court 
seems to hold that the psychological burden of having genetic children is greater than the 
inability of the other party to procreate with the embryos at issue.  Only then may a court 
consider allowing use of the embryos over the objection of the party who wants to avoid 
procreation. 
Courts in other states have relied on the Davis approach when the contracts signed by the 
parties before IVF either did not apply to disposition upon divorce, or were declared void as 
                                                
36 Davis v. Davis, 604. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
 13 
being against public policy by the jurisdiction.  In Massachusetts, the court in A.Z. v. B.Z. found 
that the agreement signed by husband and wife, directing that the embryos should be returned to 
the wife “should [they] become separated,” did not apply.40  The court disregarded the contract 
for several reasons.  First, the court found that the contract was not supposed to be binding on the 
parties in case of a disagreement between them, but instead existed to define the donors’ 
“relationship as a unit to the clinic.”41    Second, the contract did not contain a duration provision, 
and the court held that there was no evidence to suggest that they intended the contract to apply 
four years later after the circumstances of their marital relationship had changed.42  The contract 
also did not define what the parties meant by “become separated;” because separation and 
divorce are legally distinct, the court found that an agreement relating to separation could not be 
binding in divorce.43  Also, because the form was legally insufficient to be considered a 
separation agreement, it could not be binding on the parties in a divorce.44  Finally, the court 
found a problem with the fact that the husband and wife signed the original consent form 
together, but the husband signed each subsequent consent form for each IVF treatment 
separately, while it was still blank.45  The wife later filled in the provisions giving her custody of 
the embryos upon separation, which mirrored the language of the original consent form to which 
they agreed.46  The court held that because the husband signed a blank consent form, even though 
he knew what provisions would later be written, the agreement did not represent his true intent 
and therefore was not binding.47  In the divorce proceeding, the wife asked that the embryos be 
                                                
40 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
41 Ibid., 1056. 
42 Ibid., 1056-57. 
43 Ibid., 1057. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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given to her for implantation, but the husband petitioned the court to block implantation because 
he did not want to be a genetic parent.48  The court held in favor of the husband based on his 
right to avoid procreation, stating the court “would not enforce an agreement that would compel 
one donor to become a parent against his or her will.”49 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the husband’s ability to procreate without 
the frozen embryos in J.B. v. M.B., concluding that the wife’s right to avoid procreation, coupled 
with the husband’s potential for procreation by other means, meant that the embryos would not 
be given to the husband for implantation in a surrogate.50  However, the court applied this 
analysis without considering the husband’s ethical opposition to destruction of the embryos and 
his wish that the embryos be donated to allow them the opportunity to develop.51  Instead of 
engaging in an analysis that took into account his religious beliefs that an embryo should not be 
destroyed, the court simplified the dispute to consideration of only the two rights of procreative 
autonomy: the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.  There was no discussion of 
the husband’s moral position as it related to the disposition of the embryos, but as an 
afterthought, and a possible concession to his religious beliefs, the court held that, if the husband 
was willing to pay the fees, the embryos could remain cryopreserved indefinitely with the wife’s 
permission.52 
Although the Constitutional rights approach takes more factors into consideration than 
the contract approach, discussed below, it ultimately ends with a decision in favor of the party 
asserting the right to avoid procreation.  Without more, this approach is no longer an analysis, 
but the beginning of a bright-line test automatically ruling in favor of the party who refuses to 
                                                
48 Ibid., 1053. 
49 Ibid., 1057. 
50 J.B. v. M.B. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 720. 
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allow the embryo to be implanted.  This kind of approach does not attempt to place the decision 
in the hands of the progenitors, nor does it recognize the gravity of the outcome for the parties 
involved.  Instead, it gives one party the power to decide: the party who wants the embryo to be 
destroyed or remain frozen.  If the two rights of procreational autonomy are the benchmark for 
this decision, no religious belief or psychological circumstances could affect the conclusion.  
Although this approach looks at two of the fundamental rights of the parties involved, it does not 
consider enough of them to make an adequate decision. 
 
2. Contract Approach 
 
 
Other states recognize and enforce pre-IVF agreements signed by the parties that dictate the 
disposition of frozen embryos in the event of divorce in an attempt to enforce the original 
intention of the parties, effectively taking the dispute out of the hands of the court, except as a 
mechanism for interpreting the contract.  In Kass v. Kass, the couple had agreed prior to the IVF 
process that if they were unable to agree on the disposition of their embryos, then the embryos 
should be donated for research.53  At the time of their divorce settlement, the wife asked to 
implant the embryos, “claiming this is her only chance for genetic motherhood,” while the 
husband objected to the wife’s request and sought to enforce the default provision in the contract 
that specified donation for research.54  The Court of Appeals of New York upheld the agreement, 
and, reviewing the contract in its entirety, ordered the embryos to be donated for research.55 
 A Texas Court of Appeals also upheld such a contract in Roman v. Roman, holding that 
such agreements are valid and enforceable if they manifest “a voluntary unchanged mutual 
                                                
53 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (N.Y. 1998). 
54 Ibid., 175-76. 
55 Ibid., 182. 
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intention of the parties regarding disposition of the embryos upon divorce.”56  The contract at 
issue provided that, in the event of divorce, the couple wished to discard any frozen embryos that 
remained.57  In court, the wife argued that her understanding of the agreement at the time it was 
made was that only after the couple attempted to implant some of the embryos would this 
provision allow the embryos to be discarded.58  She believed that, since they had not used any of 
the embryos and therefore she did not have the chance to become pregnant, the provision 
requiring destruction of the embryos should not be enforced.59  However, the court looked only 
to the agreement, and ruled that there was a meeting of the minds between the couple at the time 
the contract was signed, and neither party had expressly revoked his or her consent to any 
provision prior to this litigation.60  Therefore, the provision was enforceable and the embryos 
were discarded.61 
 Some courts have enforced provisions of the contract that determine the disposition of the 
embryos on a technicality to avoid an in-depth discussion of the merits of this kind of conflict.62  
The Supreme Court of Washington did just this in Litowitz v. Litowitz, where the contract signed 
by both parties requested that, if one of four contingent events occurred, their embryos would be 
thawed and not allowed to develop.63  Although divorce was not specified in the agreement, one 
of the contingent events listed was cryopreservation for five years without a request for an 
                                                
56 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. App. 2006). 
57 Ibid., 42. 
58 Ibid., 53. 
59 Ibid., 53. 
60 Roman v. Roman, 54-55. 
61 Ibid., 55. 
62 See Judith Daar, “Litowitz v. Litowitz: Feuding Over Frozen Embryos and Forecasting the 
Future of Reproductive Medicine,” in Health Law & Bioethics, eds. Sandra Johnson et. al. (New York: 
Aspen Publishers), 97-119. 
63 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263-64 (Wash. 2002). 
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extension by the parties.64  The agreement also provided that, if they were not able to agree on 
the proper disposition, they should petition the court to decide for them.65  After surveying other 
states’ decisions regarding the disposition of embryos upon divorce, including the consideration 
of various interests of the parties, the court held that more than five years had passed since the 
initial cryopreservation of the embryos, and if the embryos have not already been destroyed, they 
should be thawed according to the original agreement signed by the parties.66  The decision did 
not address the petitions of either party, and the court did not engage in a discussion evaluating 
the parties’ interests in the embryos; in fact, according to the lower court opinion, neither David 
nor Becky Litowitz wanted their embryos to be destroyed.67  Although David did not want to be 
a parent, and therefore asked that the embryos be donated to a couple in another state, Becky 
hoped to implant the embryos in a surrogate so that she could raise the resulting child as her 
own.68  David ultimately was satisfied with the result, because he avoided the possibility of 
parenthood, but this case raises the question of whether contracts requiring destruction of 
embryos should be enforced when neither party wants that result.69 
 Contract law provides disputes over custody of embryos with a standard analysis, 
attempting to ensure consistency in adjudication, but it fails to anticipate and correct several 
problems that may arise.  For example, as in Litowitz, a couple who initially signed a contract 
agreeing to destroy their embryos if they decided to divorce would be held to that contract even 
if neither party wanted the embryos to be destroyed at the time of divorce.  As long as the two 
could not agree on who should take the embryos, the court, under the contract approach, would 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. at 268. 
66 Ibid. at 265-70. 
67 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wash. App. 2000). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Daar, 108. 
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enforce the provision requiring destruction.  This result is even more absurd if both of the parties 
had become morally opposed to the destruction of their embryos since signing the original 
contract.  The contract approach leaves little room for judicial consideration of these changed 
circumstances. 
 
3. Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach 
 
 
One of the more interesting examples of the judicial resolution of embryo disposition is In re 
Marriage of Witten, a 2003 Iowa case involving a contract that required the written consent of 
both parties to take any action with the embryos, but did not address the possibility of divorce.70  
In its analysis of both the contract model and what it called the contemporaneous mutual consent 
model, the court identified what it determined was a valuable principle underlying both 
approaches: the couple that created the embryos should be the ones who decide their fate.71  
However, the court, wanting to respect the freedom to contract in reproductive arrangements, 
nevertheless identified the post-agreement dispute as a fundamental problem in the contract 
model.  The intimacy and importance of such a decision requires more than a look back to the 
pre-IVF agreement in those situations in which the husband and wife no longer agree about what 
should happen to their embryos.  The court therefore determined that pre-IVF agreements are 
valid and enforceable, but subject to either party changing his or her mind.72  If the parties cannot 
agree at the time of litigation, the court held that those embryos should remain frozen to preserve 
the status quo, and therefore not prejudice either party until an agreement can be reached.73   
                                                
70 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
71 Ibid., 777. 
72 Ibid., 782. 
73 Ibid., 783. 
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This approach offers protection for parties with a strong psychological or moral aversion 
to a particular outcome while respecting, in theory, a couple’s right to contract at the start of the 
process.  In practice, contracts in this and other similar jurisdictions have no legal effect; instead, 
the outcome is based on the agreement or non-agreement of the parties at the time of litigation.  
It also raises a question about the potential outcome: what happens when the parties not only 
cannot agree, but also do not wish to continue to pay for storage?  If the court orders the 
continued cryopreservation of the embryos while both parties want them implanted, how can the 
continued payment for that freezing be ordered indefinitely?   
This approach also seems to strip the original agreement of any binding effect, stating 
that, although the agreement is valid, it is not enforceable if one of the parties has changed his or 
her mind at the time of the dispute.  In standard contract law, this would be considered a breach 
of contract, and the other party could sue for damages or specific performance.  It is likely, 
however, that if the parties agreed on disposition during their divorce, deciding what to do with 
their embryos would not become an issue for the court in the settlement agreement.  Adopting 
this approach therefore does not achieve the state goals of encouraging pre-IVF contracts and 
creating a valid test to settle disagreements, but rather places a judicial stamp of approval on the 
ability of couples to agree on how best to allocate their embryos. 
 
 
 
D. EMBRYO DONATION IN THE LAW 
 
 
Although courts have not yet had the occasion to decide disputes of parentage in embryo 
donation, as the practice expands and becomes more popular, legal challenges are likely to arise.  
Currently, few states have directly addressed the practice of embryo donation, and those that 
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have give effect to agreements between parties and often declare the birth mother to be the legal 
parent.  Still, there is no uniformity among states or in any uniform laws governing the practice, 
which leaves open the possibility of legal challenges to the custody of children born of embryo 
donation. 
 
1. Current Legislative Approaches 
 
 
Without clear legislative guidance, courts may be forced to examine the issues by analogy to 
similar situations to determine the legal rights and duties associated with embryo donation.  For 
example, the Uniform Parentage Act contains provisions addressing the donation of gametes, 
which may be seen as governing embryo donation, but these statutes do not provide clear 
legislative guidance on the issue.  Another approach is to provide legislative recognition of 
contracts for embryo donation while anticipating confirmation of that transaction through 
adoption procedures after birth.  The Georgia code, for example, provides that “the contract may 
include a written waiver by the legal embryo custodian of notice and service in any legal 
adoption or other parentage proceeding which may follow,” indicating that although adoption 
does not occur before birth, the state will recognize such contracts.74  This arrangement, 
however, relies on the cooperation of the parties in following through with the waiver of rights, 
which is often the source of litigation when reproductive technologies have been employed. 
 Still another approach is the most clear: to recognize explicitly the legality of embryo 
adoption.  To date, the only state to take this approach is Louisiana, which confers on the embryo 
the status of “juridical person” from the time of fertilization until implantation in the uterus.75  A 
juridical person may sue or be sued, and this concept is often the principle that allows 
                                                
74 Georgia Code Annotated, sec. 19-8-41 (2010). 
75 Louisiana Revised Statutes, sec. 9:123 (2011). 
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corporations to exercise these same rights to sue and be sued.76  According to Louisiana law, 
parties who wish to donate an embryo must renounce their parental rights by notarial act, and the 
recipient parents must “[execute] a notarial act of adoption of the in vitro fertilized ovum.”77 
 Other states recognize the legal parentage of the recipients based on the embryo donation 
contract, but subject to certain limitations.  In Oklahoma, the written consent of the parties on 
both sides of the transaction must be obtained, and the embryo must be the product of the 
donors’ gametes.78  If these requirements are met, the receiving parties are considered to be the 
natural parents of the resulting child, and the donors have no rights.79  In Ohio, the party or 
parties who received the donated embryo are considered to be the natural parents of the child 
born of the recipient; if a woman is single, she is considered to be the natural mother, and if she 
is married, both she and her husband are treated as the natural parents.80  This presumption of 
parenthood is rebuttable only if the husband did not give consent to the donation.81 
 Although these scattered statutes give effect to many embryo donation contracts, they are 
inconsistent across state lines and they affirm legal parenthood only in hindsight.  If a dispute 
arises between the donor and recipient families over custody of the resulting child, these laws 
require courts to look back at the intent of the original contract and determine custody based on 
the intent of the parties instead of effecting the permanent legal change in “parental” status when 
the original transfer occurs.  Although this “look back” is the natural consequence of the nature 
                                                
76 “An entity…created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, 
real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being; An 
entity is a person for purposes of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses but is not a citizen for 
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses in Article IV § 2 and in the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 9th ed. 
77 Louisiana Revised Statutes, sec. 9:130 (2011). 
78 Oklahoma Statutes, ch. 10, sec. 566 (2010). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ohio Revised Code Annotated, sec. 3111.97 (2011). 
81 Ibid. 
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of the American judicial process, establishing a more concrete and permanent mechanism of the 
transfer of custody of the embryo at the time of donation will minimize the need for courts to 
interfere with recognized legal parenthood.  The lack of such a mechanism can lead to increased 
litigation and uncertainty in such an intimate area, where couples should know at the time of 
transfer, not at birth, whether they are the legal parents. 
 
2. The Legal Insufficiency of Contract Law 
 
 
Some of the laws regarding embryo donation terminate the rights of the donor couple and 
establish the parentage of the couple receiving the embryo by assuming the child is the natural 
child of the gestational mother and her husband.  Although this seems like a definitive solution to 
the potential problem of determining parentage, the process of upholding this legislative 
declaration is based on the enforcement of the embryo donation contract.  At the outset, couples 
willing to participate in embryo donation indicate their intentions through simple written 
consent, authorizing a transfer of one or more embryos.  Under the laws of the states currently 
regulating embryo donation, the presumption of parentage attempts to block challenges to this 
transaction based on the idea that the intention of the parties who signed the agreement should be 
respected and enforced.  However, the use of contract law, despite this statutory support, opens 
the door to legal challenges based on claims of fraud or lack of capacity, which should not 
necessarily be precluded because of the presumption of parentage. 
 While it is important in areas of reproductive technologies to uphold the intentions of the 
parties most intimately involved, the process of embryo donation is too complex to be governed 
by simple contract law.  A contract approach can work with respect to business transactions with 
the fertility clinic, such as storage or transfer to another facility, because the subject of the 
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contract is not a person, but the services offered to achieve birth.  Although the contract between 
the parties and the IVF clinic is entered into with the intention of having a child as a result, the 
contract with the clinic governs the fertilization of the ovum, storage, and embryo transfer; once 
these procedures are completed, and before a child can be born, the contract no longer has effect.  
It can also be useful for determining who should get frozen embryos upon divorce or 
disagreement, because the subject of the contract will not develop into a person during the 
performance of that contract.  However, contract law is not suitable to govern a situation in 
which the subject of the contract is a person.  Although the embryo is not itself legally a person, 
the agreement between the donors and the recipients not only has as its goal the birth of a person 
from that embryo, but also is in effect until parental rights can be transferred at birth.  If birth 
were not the ultimate goal, the donor couple would not choose to donate their embryo to another 
couple, and the donee couple likewise would not participate in the program.  It is because this 
agreement necessarily contemplates the creation of a born child, and subsequently governs the 
custody of that child, that contract law is insufficient to regulate the practice. 
 
3. The Subject of Contracts 
 
 
“A contract is a promise, or set of promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”82  It is a legal vehicle that 
creates an obligation that extends until the promises on either side are fulfilled.  In embryo 
donation, the donor couple promises to transfer their interest in the embryo to the donee couple, 
giving up any and all parental rights (including the right to sue for custody), and the donee 
couple promises to accept the embryo for purposes of implantation and gestation, with the 
                                                
82 1 Samuel Williston, Contracts, sec. 1.1, 4th ed. 1990. 
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intention of raising the resulting child.  Because the embryo is not a person, the donor couple 
does not have traditional parental rights.83  Although individuals may generally waive their right 
to future property they may possess, courts do not give effect to contracts that waive future 
parental rights, because the court will always look to the best interests of the child at the time of 
the proceeding.84  For example, in the Georgia case Stanton v. Stanton, the court held that a 
prenuptial agreement signed by the husband and wife requiring their children to be raised in a 
particular faith would not bind the court to grant custody to the husband upon divorce, because 
the court looked to the child’s best interest at the time of divorce, not the agreement of the parties 
before marriage.85  As the court articulated, “Parents cannot by contract control the discretion 
and duty of the court in determining the question of custody, and the court may disregard the 
contract and award the children to either parent or to a third party if the best interest of the 
children requires it.”86 
 Contracts between parents or those who may become parents are generally unenforceable 
because they take away from the court the right to determine custody based on the best interests 
of the child.  The courts are so concerned with the welfare of the child that they always look at 
his or her best interests, regardless of the agreements anyone, including the parents, have entered 
into.  While courts may consider the contract, such agreements are not legally enforceable when 
they predetermine custody of a child.  Courts are also hesitant to uphold contracts that determine 
in advance the parental status of one or both parents, which is not only seen in prenuptial 
agreements, but in embryo disposition cases as well.  Although some jurisdictions uphold the 
                                                
83 Parental rights are “A parent’s rights to make all decisions concerning his or her child, 
including the right to determine the child’s care and custody, the right to educate and discipline the child, 
and the right to control the child’s earnings and property.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 
84 Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289, 293 (Ga. 1957). 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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contract approach to allocation of embryos upon divorce, many others consider the parties’ 
constitutional rights and other interests in determining who should have “custody” of the 
embryos, and whether those embryos should be allowed to develop into a born child.  
 For example, the husband and wife in A.Z. v. B.Z. signed a contract providing that, in the 
event of the couple’s separation, the right to custody of the embryos be given to the wife for 
implantation if she still wished to gestate them.87  Although the court ultimately determined that 
the agreement did not contemplate divorce and therefore did not apply, it explained in dicta that 
if the contract did apply, the wife still would not have received the embryos and the same result 
would have been reached.88  According to the court, it “would not enforce an agreement that 
would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will,” even if there were a 
contract in place in advance where that donor relinquished his or her claim to the embryo.89  In 
these cases, as explained earlier, the constitutional right of a progenitor of an embryo to avoid 
procreation is often the reason courts block implantation, even if that party had originally signed 
an agreement allowing for implantation.  Courts wish to respect the right of parties to change 
their minds about procreation using their frozen embryos, because this kind of transaction is 
more fundamental and intimate than property transfers.  If this kind of contract, which provides 
for the relinquishment of future parental rights and subsequent implantation in another woman 
upon divorce, is not enforceable in many jurisdictions in cases of embryo disposition, how could 
similar contracts be enforced in embryo donation?  Although it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to block the “forced procreation” of the objecting donor in embryo donation if the 
embryo has already been implanted, it is conceivable that one or both parties to the embryo 
donation contract could change his or her mind after the contract became effective but before it 
                                                
87 A.Z. v. B.Z., 1054. 
88 Ibid., 1057-58. 
89 Ibid., 1057. 
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was implanted.  If simple contract law were applied to this situation, as in prenuptial agreements 
containing custody provisions and contracts about disposition of embryos, the contract would 
likely be considered unenforceable.   
 Insufficiency of contract law is evident in other areas of reproductive technologies such 
as gestational surrogacy arrangements.  In such situations, couples often contract with a woman 
who agrees to implant and gestate the embryo, and return the child to the intended parents after 
birth.  She also agrees as part of the arrangement to relinquish parental rights when they arise at 
birth to allow the intended parents to have full custody of the child.  However, several courts 
have been faced with legal challenges to these contracts brought by the surrogate mother who 
refuses to give up the child and instead asserts her own parental rights.  In Johnson v. Calvert, 
the intended parents brought an action to challenging the surrogate mother’s declaration that she 
is the “natural mother” of the child she gestated for Mark and Crispina Calvert.90  Although the 
court recognized both as “natural mothers” under the Uniform Parentage Act, which provided 
that both genetic link and giving birth are evidence of parentage, the laws of California 
prohibited more than one woman being named the mother of a child.91  The court thus turned to 
the test of intent, and determined that the Calverts, who entered into this agreement with the 
intent of parenting the resulting child, were the legal parents.92   
 The Uniform Parentage Act, amended in 2000, clarified the legal status of the gestational 
mother for those states that have adopted it, but jurisdictions without the UPA and cases 
involving more complex reproductive arrangements have led to a continuous stream of litigation 
                                                
90 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Ca. 1993). 
91 Ibid., 781-82. 
92 Ibid., 782. 
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about parental status.93  Furthermore, although the courts often look back to the gestational 
surrogacy contract and recognize the intent to parent as the deciding factor in these cases, the 
UPA’s prescribed procedure for such arrangements requires the intended parents to “file notice 
with the court that a child has been born to the gestational mother within 300 days after assisted 
reproduction,” and the court will confirm the intended parents’ legal parenthood.94  Despite the 
original arrangement that specifies the parties who assume parental rights over the resulting 
child, the courts do not recognize legal parenthood (and the intended parents cannot file) until 
after the birth of the child.95  This is an indication that, although the contract may ultimately be 
enforced, the judicial system does not recognize parental rights or their transfer until after birth.  
If this recognition does not occur until after birth, it leaves open the possibility of the donor 
couple refusing to follow through with the adoption paperwork and challenging the donee couple 
for parental rights before the formal adoption is completed. 
While contract law may be sufficient in most situations to govern the transfer and 
gestation of an embryo between consenting parties, it does not provide the finality and assurance 
that agreements involving embryos and children need.  In embryo donation, the purpose of the 
practice is to give individuals the opportunity to become parents with the embryos another 
couple has already created, not merely to transfer ownership of a frozen embryo that will remain 
frozen.  The result of this arrangement, if biology permits, is a child, and couples who “contract” 
for that child deserve the reassurance that their agreement is permanent, immune from legal 
challenges and immediately recognizable under the law, which are protections that contract law 
is unable to provide.
                                                
93 Uniform Parentage Act, sec. 807 (2002); see In re C.K.G., C.A.G., & C.L.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 
(Tn. 2005). 
94 Uniform Parentage Act, sec. 807. 
95 Ibid. 
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III. CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON EMBRYO DONATION 
 
 
 
 
The Catholic Church has historically taken a strong interest in bioethical issues as evidenced by 
the bioethical nature of many encyclicals in the last century.96  In particular, the Church has 
focused much of its attention on reproductive ethics, articulating clear teaching on several topics 
including contraception, abortion, and many reproductive technologies.  However, the Church, 
like the law, has yet to formulate a definitive stance on the practice of embryo donation or 
adoption.  While some theologians, such as Christopher Tollefsen,97 argue that this technology 
will provide a solution to what the Church views as the dilemma of cryopreserved embryos, 
others, including Mary Geach98 and Monsignor William Smith,99 insist such technology violates 
long-held Catholic moral principles of procreation. 
                                                
96 See, e.g., Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, Of Human Life, July 25, 1968, Vatican Website, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-
vitae_en.html; Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Donum Vitae, On Respect for Human Life in its 
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, February 22, 1987, Vatican Website, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respec
t-for-human-life_en.html. 
97 Christoper O. Tollefsen, “Could Human Embryo Transfer Be Intrinsically Immoral?” in The 
Ethics of Embryo Adoption and the Catholic Tradition: Moral Arguments, Economic Reality and Social 
Analysis, eds. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard Weaver (Springer Science + Business Media 
B.V., 2007), 85. 
98 William E. May, Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Human Life (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday 
Visitor, Inc., 2000), 96. 
99 Reverend William E. Stempsey, “Heterologous Embryo Transfer: Metaphor and Morality,” in 
The Ethics of Embryo Adoption and the Catholic Tradition: Moral Arguments, Economic Reality and 
Social Analysis, eds. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard Weaver (Springer Science + Business 
Media B.V., 2007), 31. 
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 The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), which is charged with the duty “to 
promote and safeguard the doctrine on the faith and morals throughout the Catholic world,”100 
formulated a general instruction on licit treatments for infertility in its document Dignitas 
Personae:  
“With regard to the treatment of infertility, new medical techniques must respect 
three fundamental goods: a) the right to life and to physical integrity of every 
human being from conception to natural death; b) the unity of marriage, which 
means reciprocal respect for the right within marriage to become a father or 
mother only together with the other spouse; c) the specifically human values of 
sexuality which require ‘that the procreation of a human person brought about as 
the fruit of the conjugal act specific to the love between spouses’.”101    
 
Many of the Church’s teachings on sexual and reproductive ethics are based on the principle of 
the indissolubility of marriage102, and the principle that all sexual acts must be unitive and 
procreative, which both affirm the couple’s marital union, their openness to children, and the 
inseparability of the two.103  In 1968, Pope Paul VI authored the encyclical Humanae Vitae, 
which clearly articulated this long-standing teaching on marriage and procreation.104  The 
doctrine states that the nature of the marital union is to “[unite] husband and wife in the closest 
                                                
100 Vatican, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_pro_14071997_en.ht
ml (accessed March 16, 2011). 
101 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Dignitas Personae, Instruction Dignitas Personae on 
Certain Bioethical Questions, February 22, 1987, Vatican Website, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignit
as-personae_en.html, sec. 12. 
102 For purposes of clarity, the indissolubility of marriage is explained in the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church: “The covenant between the spouses is integrated into God’s covenant with man…Thus 
the marriage bond has been established by God himself in such a way that a marriage concluded and 
consummated between baptized persons can never be dissolved. This bond, which results from the free 
human act of the spouses and their consummation of the marriage, is a reality, henceforth irrevocable…” 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, sec. 1639-40.  
103 Humanae Vitae. 
104 See Pius XI, Casti Connubii, On Christian Marriage, December 31, 1930, Vatican Website, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-
connubii_en.html. 
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intimacy [and render] them capable of generating new life.”105  The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church further explains this concept in section 2363: “The spouses’ union106 achieves the 
twofold end of marriage: the good of the spouses themselves and the transmission of life.  These 
two meanings or values of marriage cannot be separated without altering the couple’s spiritual 
life and compromising the goods of marriage and the future of the family.”107   
 The Church claims that union and procreation are so fundamental to the nature of 
marriage that any act or technology that separates the two purposes of the marital act is deemed 
illicit.108  The use of chemical, barrier, or sterilizing methods of contraception is therefore 
ethically impermissible because their intended purpose is to close the sex act to the possibility of 
procreation.109  Similarly, IVF separates the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act 
because it causes conception to occur outside of that act, and is therefore also not permissible 
according to Church teaching.  The CDF stated in its publication Donum Vitae, “[A] child has 
the right to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up within 
marriage.”110  Furthermore, the Church teaches that reproduction that separates these two 
purposes changes the nature of the act from procreation to production, “treating the child as if he 
or she were a product.”111  It is from this principle of inseparability that the Church reaches its 
conclusions that certain reproductive technologies are illicit. 
 
 
                                                
105 Humanae Vitae, sec. 12. 
106 Spousal union refers to the sexual union of husband and wife. 
107 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2d ed. (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 
1997), 2363. 
108 Donum Vitae. 
109 There are limited circumstances in which contraception can licitly be used as emergency 
contraception after rape, if tests indicate the woman has not conceived or ovulated. Ethical and Religious 
Directive 36. 
110 Donum Vitae, II-A-1. 
111 May, 79. 
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A. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
 
 
The Church claims that the process of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer (IVF-ET) is 
always illicit because it separates the two purposes of the marital act and makes the child a 
product of technology instead of the result of a procreative act.  According to William May, 
“When new human life comes to be as a result of…homologous IVF-ET, it comes to be as the 
end product of a series of actions, transitive in nature, undertaken by different persons in order to 
make a particular product, a human baby.”112     
 The Church distinguishes between heterologous and homologous IVF, but both are still 
deemed illicit.113  In heterologous IVF, one or both gametes used in creating the embryo are from 
a donor instead of the intended mother or father, and the resulting embryo is implanted into the 
gestational mother, who may or may not be the intended mother.114  It is condemned as illicit by 
the Church in part because it allows a woman to conceive a child and become pregnant by the 
sperm of a man who is not her husband, which violates what Catholic doctrine asserts is an 
inviolable marital covenant where the union and procreation should occur through the spouses 
alone.115  Homologous IVF uses the gametes of both of the intended parents to create the embryo 
to be implanted.116  This kind of IVF is most useful for couples who have viable gametes and 
wish to have genetically-related offspring.  Although the woman does become pregnant through 
use of her husband’s sperm, unlike heterologous IVF, procreation still occurs outside of the 
womb and outside of the sexual act, and is therefore illicit.117   
 
                                                
112 May, 81. 
113 Ibid., 80. 
114 Donum Vitae, II 
115 May, 80. 
116 Donum Vitae, II 
117 May, 80-81. 
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B. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
 
Gestational surrogacy uses the same technology as IVF to fertilize an egg and implant an 
embryo; therefore, this practice also violates the principle of inseparability of union and 
procreation and has similarly been deemed impermissible by the Church.118  However, the added 
practice of implanting the embryo into a woman who intends to gestate the embryo for the sole 
purpose of returning the born child to the intended parents provides an additional ethical problem 
in Catholic teaching.  It divides the “physical, psychological and moral elements which 
constitute…families,” because the Church teaches a child should be conceived, carried, born to 
and brought up by its own parents whenever possible.119  In gestational surrogacy, not only has 
the embryo been deprived of the right to be conceived in its mother’s womb, but also the right to 
be carried by and born of its mother.  Instead, the genetic or intended mother has given the 
embryo to another woman to nurture and gestate the embryo, which will then be returned to the 
intended mother.  The Church teaches that such gestational surrogacy arrangements violate 
marital chastity by separating the unitive and procreative aspects of the marital act, and cause a 
“division between the physical, psychological and moral elements which 
constitute…families.”120 
 
 
 
C. THE EMBRYO DONATION DEBATE 
 
 
Although the Catholic Church has articulated many teachings on the ethics of reproductive 
technologies, it has not officially addressed the practice of embryo donation in any meaningful 
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way.  Those who argue against it identify its similarities to, and potential complicity in, other 
reproductive technologies that have been determined to be illicit, such as surrogacy and IVF, and 
believe embryo donation is similarly contrary to current Catholic social teaching on procreation 
and marital chastity.121  However, this novel issue of frozen embryos has created a situation that 
requires more than an assumption that embryo donation is merely another illicit reproductive 
technology, because current Catholic social teaching doesn’t address and would be 
inappropriately applied to the exploration of potential ethically permissible options for the 
disposition of frozen embryos.  This ethical permissibility relies on a deeper understanding of the 
contexts in which embryo donation should be allowed, recognizing the moral neutrality of the act 
of embryo transfer and applying the Church’s understanding about life.  The next three sections 
raise three objections to the moral permissibility of embryo donation in the Catholic tradition, 
and discuss the reasons why these objections do not provide an adequate basis for the argument 
that embryo donation is impermissible. 
 
1. It is Like IVF 
 
 
The CDF, in Dignitas Personae, briefly mentioned embryo donation or “prenatal adoption,” but 
dismissed it as illicit in the same way as other reproductive technologies without much 
discussion.122  The Church has rejected IVF and other reproductive technologies because they 
replace the sexual act as the “cause” of human conception.  When fertilization occurs in a 
laboratory, the procreative and unitive goods of marriage are separated; the procreation occurs 
without the corresponding union of spouses.  After that fertilization, in IVF without a surrogate, 
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the resulting embryo is implanted into the mother to be gestated and born, and subsequently 
raised by that mother.   
IVF necessarily involves both in vitro fertilization and implantation, but the Church in its 
historical evaluation of the practice has never considered these actions separately.  In the context 
of embryo donation, although conception occurs outside of the marital act, the entire IVF process 
is stopped and implantation does not occur in conjunction with the original IVF.  The couple that 
intends to gestate the embryo does not attempt to conceive outside of the marital act, but to 
intervene in the illicit IVF process begun by another and nurture what the Church considers the 
“life” of the already-existing embryo.   
Once fertilization has occurred, the Church teaches that the embryo is a separately 
existing full human person, entitled to “the inviolable right of every innocent being to life.”123  
Building upon this belief, one can reconceptualize the transfer and subsequent implantation of 
the embryo; although in vitro fertilization and implantation are both components of illicit 
reproductive technologies, once the embryo is formed and subsequently abandoned, implantation 
is no longer part of the IVF process but a separate and distinct medical procedure intended to 
provide shelter and nutrition to what the Church calls a human person.  Therefore, although the 
Church calls procreation outside of the marital act illicit, embryo donation is not itself 
procreation, because procreation has already occurred.  This distinction is necessary to establish 
the permissibility of embryo donation, because while IVF violates Catholic principles of 
sexuality and deprives the embryo of the right to be conceived in the womb, embryo donation 
respects the dignity of early human life (as defined by the Church) by providing the embryo with 
the opportunity to be gestated, born, and parented by its adoptive parents.  Because this 
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procedure is not procreation, although it shares characteristics of illicit reproductive 
technologies, it is not analogous to IVF in a moral evaluation and therefore should not be 
condemned on that basis. 
 
2. The Church has Already Condemned The Practice 
 
 
Monsignor William Smith presents his argument against embryo donation by relying on the 
language of Donum Vitae as evidence of the Church’s already-existing condemnation of the 
procedure.  Under the document’s discussion of the use of embryos obtained by IVF for research 
purposes, the CDF asserts that no acts can be performed that lead to the destruction of the 
embryo because the Church “forbids acts against the life of these human beings.”124  This section 
ends with the passage on which Smith relies to justify a condemnation of embryo donation: “In 
consequence of the fact that they have been produced in vitro, those embryos which are not 
transferred into the body of the mother and are called ‘spare’ are exposed to an absurd fate, with 
no possibility of their being offered safe means of survival which can be licitly pursued.”125  
Smith argues that this excerpt should be read at face value, explicitly stating that no option for 
these frozen embryos, including embryo donation, could be licit.126 
 This passage, written in 1987, was written as a response to the suggestion that spare 
embryos could be used for research, which is clearly against Catholic Church teaching because it 
leads to the intentional destruction of the embryo.  Donum Vitae does not address the option of 
embryo donation, which could prevent the destruction or deterioration of frozen embryos, and 
enable them to develop into born children.  Moreover, Donum Vitae does not consider the act of 
implantation separate from in vitro fertilization.  The document instead focuses on IVF, 
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surrogacy, and research on embryos, which were the emerging technologies of the time, and 
treats them as “packaged” technologies or social practices.  
 If this failure to address embryo donation was an accidental omission, and the Church 
intended to indicate its disapproval of embryo donation, the CDF had the opportunity to correct 
this in its 2008 document, Dignitas Personae.  In it, for the first time, the CDF addressed both 
embryo transfer as a treatment for infertility and “prenatal adoption.”127  Although the document 
dismisses embryo donation “as a treatment for infertility,” it only addresses “prenatal adoption” 
by suggesting it presents “various problems not dissimilar to those mentioned above [regarding 
IVF and surrogacy].”128  There is no further discussion of the reason that such a procedure would 
be illicit, or an examination of the morality of embryo transfer per se.  The section concludes 
with a vague statement from Pope John Paul II, which suggests that the door has not been closed 
on the moral permissibility of embryo donation: “[T]here seems to be no morally licit solution 
regarding the human destiny of the thousands and thousands of ‘frozen’ embryos which are and 
remain the subjects of essential rights and should therefore be protected by law as human 
persons.”129  This statement, in contrast to the statement from Donum Vitae that addressed 
embryonic research, applies directly to the option of embryo donation, and states that there seems 
to be no licit solution, not that no licit solution exists.  While Donum Vitae is explicit about the 
Church’s prohibition of procedures that would destroy the embryo, Dignitas Personae does not 
definitively condemn heterologous embryo transfer (HET) in all contexts as intrinsically 
immoral. 
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 John Berkman also presents a possible interpretation of the passage from Donum Vitae, 
arguing that the meaning of “spare” embryos is at the core of the misunderstanding.130  For 
Berkman, the spare embryos referred to in Donum Vitae are “those that are destined not to be 
implanted and not…those that could be implanted.”131  The destruction of the embryos is the 
“absurd fate” referred to in Donum Vitae, and Berkman claims that the passage is descriptive 
(saying the embryos are not going to be implanted) and not prescriptive (declaring that the 
embryos should not be implanted).132 
 
3. Embryo Transfer is Intrinsically Immoral 
 
 
Gestational surrogacy requires in vitro fertilization to create the embryos, transfer of those 
embryos to the surrogate’s uterus, and the promise that the surrogate will give the child to the 
intended parents after birth.  Although the Church condemned this process IVF and embryo 
transfer as understood in the context of gestational surrogacy, many claim that even after 
conception has occurred ex vivo, the act of implantation itself, regardless of the circumstances, is 
wrong.  Mary Geach, a philosopher, presents one of the strongest arguments against the 
permissibility of embryo donation in the Catholic tradition by arguing that embryo transfer is 
intrinsically immoral.  Geach claims that just as in vitro fertilization is immoral because it 
imitates and replaces the marital act, any act of impregnating a woman through means other than 
sexual intercourse with her husband, including embryo donation, similarly imitates and replaces 
the marital act and the fruits that are intended to flow from that act, and is thus immoral.133  
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Geach argues that HET is never acceptable, and cannot be saved by a couple’s noble intention to 
“rescue” or “adopt” a frozen embryo. 
 Although scholars such as Christopher Tollefsen have argued that fertilization and 
implantation are morally distinct acts, and only fertilization is a per se violation of the Church’s 
teaching on the dual purpose of the marital act, Geach argues that the definition of the marital act 
necessarily includes the possibility of pregnancy, because sexual intercourse is “an act of 
admission whereby [the woman] allows a carnal intromission of an impregnating kind.”134  She 
claims that just as in sexual intercourse, “the wife permits intromission of the husband’s 
semen… the function of which is to make her pregnant,” embryo transfer is an intromission of an 
embryo, “the function of which is to make [that woman] pregnant.”135  Being open to becoming 
pregnant, then, is part of the marital act and integral to its generative function.  If this were true, 
then any act that makes a woman pregnant outside of the marital/generative act cannot be licit, 
which would include embryo donation. 
 Catherine Althaus agrees with Geach’s argument, and does not see IVF and HET as 
separate acts of individual moral significance; instead, she argues that although conception 
“grants life to the child and makes the woman and man parents, pregnancy is part of the 
procreative process because it uniquely: 1. Develops the woman as a mother, 2. Sustains and 
develops the life of the child [and] 3. Sustains the paternity of the father.”136  Reverend Tadeusz 
Pacholczyk holds a similar view, claiming that the essence of the Church’s condemnation of 
surrogacy is “the decision of a woman to receive an embryo into her uterus in a way other than 
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as a consequence of conjugal relations with her husband or with another man.”137  Embryo 
donation is thus similar because the woman allows herself to be impregnated with an embryo 
that was not the result of a conjugal act.   
 Christopher Tollefsen defends embryo donation by arguing against the intrinsic 
immorality of HET in two ways.  First, he claims that “the complementarity necessary for there 
to be a union of two in one flesh is exhausted in certain facts of generation itself.”138  By this, 
Tollefsen means that the union necessary for a moral marital act according to the Church occurs 
when the spouses perform the type of act oriented to reproduction, which does not make use of 
contraception and is open to life.  This marital union occurs whether or not reproduction is 
actualized; if this were not so, then no act of intercourse between spouses would be properly 
considered a “marital act.”  This is contrary to the Church’s teaching that any sexual act oriented 
toward the union of spouses and open to procreation is a marital act, even if that act does not 
result in procreation. 
 Second, Tollefsen takes issue with Geach’s claim that the man “makes the female 
pregnant” as part of his proper role in the marital act, and any procedure that replaces that male 
act of “making pregnant” is an imitation of the marital act, and therefore illicit.139  He begins by 
arguing that using this language perpetuates a “false biology” that the man takes the active role 
in reproduction, while the woman is passive.140  Geach relies on the idea that the man’s active 
role of making pregnant means that the possibility of pregnancy is necessarily part of the marital 
act, but Tollefsen says that neither the man nor the woman individually makes her pregnant, 
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because both take an active role in reproduction.141  In fact, he claims it can be said that once the 
egg is fertilized, the newly existing embryo makes the woman pregnant through its own self-
directed development.142  Regardless of the “cause” of pregnancy, however, Tollefsen claims that 
neither the woman nor the man make her pregnant, but rather engage in the marital act which is 
the type of act that could generate life and lead to pregnancy.143  The marital act is satisfied by a 
sexual act that is unitive and procreative in its nature, which is “apt for bringing together sperm 
and an egg,” not that which “makes pregnant.”144  Therefore, since the marital act is not an act of 
“making pregnant,” the act of transferring an embryo into a woman’s womb, which is an act of 
“making pregnant,” cannot be considered an imitation of the marital act.  Embryo transfer is thus 
not illicit by virtue of replacing the marital act. 
 Just as Tollefsen delineates between “making pregnant” and the marital act, one can also 
argue that it is not “being pregnant” that makes a woman a mother or “making pregnant” that 
makes a man a father, because men and women can be parents without experiencing pregnancy 
or a genetic relationship to the child.  Althaus relies on a passage in Donum Vitae that argues that 
spouses have a “right to become a father and a mother only through each other,” to support her 
opposition to embryo donation.145  She argues that a woman who allows herself to become 
pregnant with a child that is not genetically related to her husband leaves her husband out of 
procreation and therefore violates the principle of marital chastity.146,147  However, a woman does 
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not become a “mother” solely by virtue of a pregnancy.  For example, the woman of an adopting 
couple does not experience pregnancy with that child, but the adopting parents are still correctly 
considered mother and father through adoption.  Likewise, the Church calls a man and a woman 
who undergo IVF “parents” even while their embryos are still frozen and have never been 
implanted.148  According to the Church, man and woman become father and mother when they 
either generate a child biologically or adopt a child legally, not when a woman’s pregnancy 
begins.  Although Althaus argues that in embryo donation a woman would become a mother 
through the pregnancy while the man would be excluded from the process, in fact the woman 
and the man would become mother and father at the same time: the moment they consented to 
and completed the necessary legal steps to take “custody” of the embryo.  As in adoption of born 
children, the spouses would become mother and father through their mutual consent to adopt the 
embryo, not through the ensuing pregnancy and birth. 
 
4. Those Who Engage In Embryo Donation are Complicit in IVF 
 
 
Tracy Jamison presents the argument that embryo donation cooperates “in the evil of artificial 
fertilization.”149  In Catholic moral teaching, the morality of acts committed by someone 
cooperating with a wrongdoer can be evaluated through the classifications of formal and material 
cooperation.150  In formal cooperation, “the cooperator agrees with and intends the procedure.”151  
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Formal cooperation with a person committing an evil act is always forbidden.152  With indirect or 
material cooperation, an action is permitted if it is sufficiently removed from the evil act, there is 
no danger of scandal, and there is a proportionate reason to engage in the activity.153  This 
concept is often used in the context of abortion, where nurses or other healthcare workers are 
required to perform job duties related to abortion procedures.154  Where a nurse may be allowed 
to set up tools used in the abortion if this duty is only a small part of his or her job, that nurse 
“would probably not be permitted to work at an abortion clinic.”155  In material cooperation, “the 
more remote the … cooperation, the more likely it is to be right.”156 
 Jamison suggests that the participation in embryo donation, which relies on IVF to 
provide the embryos that will be donated, cooperates in the illicit IVF action.157  However, 
simply because the action could not be taken unless the illicit act (IVF) had been performed does 
not imply that the separate and distinct act of embryo adoption cooperated in the original illicit 
act.  As understood in Catholic teaching, embryo donation would be a remedial action to correct 
the unfortunate circumstances caused by the illicit IVF procedure.  As previously argued, the act 
of embryo transfer itself is not intrinsically immoral, and is therefore a morally indifferent action 
that is only illicit if carried out in illicit circumstances, such as within a comprehensive IVF-ET 
therapy.   
 Analyzed in terms of formal and material cooperation, one must examine both the object 
and the intention of the act to determine the degree of complicity.  The object of embryo 
donation is the medical transfer of a frozen embryo into a uterus to provide the opportunity to 
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develop and flourish.  The intention is twofold: to “save” the embryo from what the Catholic 
Church calls an “absurd fate,” and to remedy the deprivation of rights of the embryo caused by 
IVF.158  The object of the wrongdoers, who, in this case, are the patients who began IVF to create 
embryos, was to fertilize an ovum outside of the conjugal act, and subsequently implant the 
embryo in the uterus.  Their intention was to circumvent the conjugal act to provide them with a 
child through reproductive technologies.  Those who participate in embryo donation to provide 
an environment in which the embryo may flourish do not engage in, nor intend, the object of 
procreating outside of the marital act.  Furthermore, embryo donation does not enable the 
practice of IVF in any way, because the act of embryo donation does not contribute to, aid, or 
facilitate the ex vivo fertilization of an ovum, which is the morally impermissible object.  It is 
through this separation of the act of fertilization and the act of implantation that embryo donation 
is properly considered a corrective intervention in, and not cooperation with, an illicit process. 
 
 
 
D. THE EMBRYO IS A CHILD 
 
 
One of the Catholic Church’s clearest teachings is, “The human being is to be respected and 
treated as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment his 
rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place in the inviolable right of 
every innocent human being to life.”159  In the Catholic tradition, embryo donation must be 
approached from this foundational principle: the frozen embryo is a human person in need of the 
environment in which it can grow and flourish.  Although Catholic arguments against embryo 
donation recognize this personhood, they contend that the process of transferring the embryo into 
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a womb violates the dignity of the woman and her husband, which would lead one to believe this 
dignity is more important than the life of the embryo.160 
 The Church, however, has recognized the embryo’s dignity and teaches that embryonic 
life must be supported and protected absolutely.161  In fact, the Church stated in Donum Vitae, 
“One must uphold as licit procedures carried out on the human embryo which…are directed 
towards its healing, the improvement of its condition of health, or its individual survival.”162  
This statement was not accompanied by a limitation on procedures that have an impact on the 
woman’s well being, either physically, psychologically, or morally.  Instead, the Church 
emphasizes the moral worth of the embryo and explains the lengths to which medicine may go to 
support the health or life of the embryo.  In cryopreservation, the embryo is unable to develop.  It 
does not grow, nor obtain nutrients, because it is frozen in its development.  Embryo donation 
seeks to provide the embryo with basic human needs, such as shelter and nutrition, which are 
necessary for human flourishing but are denied to those in cryopreservation.163  HET in this 
situation would be a “procedure carried out on the human embryo which…[is] directed 
towards…its individual survival.”164  According to the Church’s own teaching, such a procedure 
“must be upheld as licit” because it is a life-improving intervention for the embryo and would 
save the embryo from eventual deterioration, according to the teaching that the frozen embryo is 
a life.165  Without implantation, the embryo is denied access to its normal course of development. 
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 As previously stated, the Church teaches that because life begins at conception, “[that] 
child has the right to be conceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up 
within marriage.”166  IVF severs the first right from the other three; it takes away the right of 
what the Church considers to be a child to be conceived in the womb.  Likewise, gestational 
surrogacy not only takes away the right to conception in the womb, but also the right to be 
carried by and born to the child’s mother.  Embryo donation seeks to remedy the loss of the first 
right by offering the embryo the womb of its new mother and the prospect of being born to and 
raised by that same mother.  While the Church maintains the absolute right of the child to these 
four conditions, it has not addressed the question of whether, if one right is violated, actions can 
be taken to provide the other rights in an attempt to remedy that loss.  It is clear from the 
Church’s embrace of the adoption of born children that it does not condemn all practices in 
which one or more of these rights have been violated.  For example, if a woman conceives a 
child that she is unable to care for, but carries and gives birth to the child, she may give her child 
to another in adoption.  The child’s fourth right, to be raised by his genetic parents, has been 
sacrificed, but in many cases such a sacrifice is licit.167 
 While embryo donation involves more intricate and intimate procedures to enable 
couples to fulfill rights of an embryo than post-birth adoption, the purpose of both embryo 
donation and post-birth adoption are to provide the basic needs of human flourishing, which 
should not be forsaken to protect the concept of marital chastity.  If the Church determines that, 
after the right to be conceived in the womb is violated in IVF, all of the other rights must be 
sacrificed as well to preserve marital chastity, then the Church is essentially prioritizing the 
virtue of chastity over the right to life.   
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 This prioritization of marital chastity over life is inconsistent with many other Church 
teachings that elevate life to the highest standard, requiring in almost every case that life be 
upheld whenever there is a conflict between life and another competing interest.  In cases of 
rape, for example, the Church recognizes sexual assault as intrinsically evil, but does not permit 
a female victim to take emergency contraception if there is any possibility that she may have 
conceived between the time of the rape and the time she sought medical treatment, even if a 
pregnancy cannot be verified.  The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services identify the situations in which contraception may be obtained.168  Directive 36 
recognizes that a woman has the right “to defend herself against a potential conception from the 
sexual assault,” but medications to prevent this conception may only be administered “[i]f, after 
appropriate testing, there is no evidence that conception has occurred already.”169  While many in 
the scientific community place pregnancy at the time of implantation,170 the Church teaches that 
pregnancy begins at fertilization.171  Therefore, many Catholic hospitals require ovulation testing 
if a pregnancy test is negative to determine if there is any possibility that the rape victim could 
have conceived between the time of her rape and when she sought medical treatment.  If this 
possibility exists, emergency contraception will not be dispensed.  This limitation exists to 
protect the potential fertilized ovum, as one of the potential effects of emergency contraception is 
to interfere with the implantation of the embryo into the uterus.  Due to the difficulty in 
indentifying the occurrence of fertilization until 10-14 days after conception, or around the time 
of implantation, the practical effect of this requirement according to the National Catholic 
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Bioethics Center is that the only moral use of emergency contraception in cases of rape is to 
prevent ovulation.172 
 This Catholic policy illustrates the Church’s strong preference to protect not only 
embryonic life, but also potential embryonic life, even if it greatly burdens others.  A woman 
who has been the victim of rape may face debilitating consequences such as post traumatic stress 
disorder, depression, and shame or guilt that may be projected onto the child if she becomes 
pregnant and must carry the child to term, even if she ultimately gives that child up for 
adoption.173  Still, the Church maintains that the embryo she conceives, although a product of a 
horrific act, is an innocent child who must be protected and given priority over the woman’s well 
being.  If embryonic life is elevated above the overall health of a female rape victim, then it 
would be inconsistent for the Church to maintain that chastity should be protected above life in 
the case of embryo donation.  Catholic bioethics maintains that life should always be protected; 
this principle should include “lives” that can be protected and nurtured if they are provided a 
womb. 
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IV. THE ADOPTION SOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
Reconceptualizing the practice of embryo donation as embryo adoption can solve both the legal 
problem of regulation discussed in chapter two and the Catholic ethical concerns discussed in 
chapter three.  This solution is not an issue of rhetoric, using the language of adoption to advance 
a belief that persons exist from the moment of conception; it is a substantive change in approach 
that provides the necessary legal and ethical frameworks to adequately confront and encourage 
this reproductive practice. 
In the narrow context of the transfer of a frozen embryo to a genetically unrelated couple 
who wishes to implant, gestate and raise the resulting child as their own, traditional principles of 
adoption should govern the arrangement to ensure the transfer of future parental rights is 
permanent and to safeguard the interests of all involved.  Although the embryo is not legally a 
person, it is possible to confer upon it certain rights that allow it to be the subject of an adoption 
proceeding without investing it with personhood status or abrogating recognized reproductive 
rights.   
States should have flexibility in determining the specific requirements for the proceeding, 
as they do in adoption of born children, but generally the process should include a background 
check of the adoptive parents, a home study, and a judicial declaration of adoption.174  This 
proceeding should occur at the time of transfer, allowing for a statutorily determined period of 
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time for the donors to revoke their consent to the adoption before the embryo is implanted into 
the gestational mother.  Once the adoption has been finalized and the embryo is transferred to the 
gestational mother’s womb, the adoptive parents should be treated legally as if they had 
conceived the child without the use of the assisted reproductive technologies that may call their 
parental status into question.  This treatment would include not only full parental rights once the 
child is born, but also full reproductive liberties that apply to a pregnant woman, including the 
right to obtain an abortion.  This framework, properly applied to the narrow context of embryo 
donation, can resolve ambiguities in both the law and in private reproductive arrangements while 
facilitating this practice as an option for individuals and couples with frozen embryos they are 
unable or unwilling to gestate themselves. 
 
 
 
A. EMBRYO ADOPTION IN THE LAW 
 
 
It seems that legislatures have maintained a contract approach to regulation of embryo donation 
to prevent challenges to, and an encroachment of, reproductive rights that have been historically 
held to be fundamental constitutional liberties.  However, states also have an interest in ensuring 
that these agreements are upheld where they are made, minimizing legal challenges to 
arrangements that involve the gestation and future custody of children.  Utilizing an adoption 
framework to regulate this kind of embryo transfer can not only provide assurance of the 
permanence of the arrangement, but also work with current reproductive jurisprudence without 
eroding these rights. 
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1. Protects Interests by Providing Permanence 
 
 
In embryo donation, three parties have interests in the agreement: the donor(s), the donee(s), and 
the state.  The donors may have an interest in knowing who will receive their embryos, because 
some donors may feel that their embryos are their children.175  Even for those who do not believe 
their embryos are their children, they may nonetheless still be invested in the embryos’ futures, 
expressing concern about the lives their future genetic children may experience without their 
genetic parents or siblings.176  This concern for their future genetic children could lead some 
donors to desire some control over the selection of adoptive parents, which is not currently 
always available in embryo donation.177 
 The donees also have an interest in seeking assurance that the agreement they are 
entering into, which may lead to the birth of a child if the embryo implants and biology allows, is 
and will remain valid and enforceable.  As the “adoptive parents” of the embryo, their intention 
and hope is to become parents through this arrangement.  Just as it seems unfair that, despite 
signing an gestational surrogacy agreement, the intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement 
could be faced with a custody challenge by the gestational surrogate who seeks to prevent the 
intended parents from parenting the child they hoped for, it is also unfair that donees could enter 
into an agreement to transfer the embryos and achieve pregnancy and birth without having the 
confidence that their parental rights will not be challenged. 
                                                
175 See, e.g., Embryo Adoption Awareness Center, www.embryoadoption.org (accessed March 23, 
2011); Nightlight Christian Adoptions, www.nightlight.org/adoption-services/snowflakes-embryo 
(accessed March 23, 2011). 
176 Ibid. 
177 Private agencies such as Nightlight Christian Adoptions, which runs the Snowflakes Frozen 
Embryo Adoption and Donation Program, address these interests by applying a traditional adoption 
process, including a home study. 
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 The state’s interest in the agreement between parties is similar to its interest in both the 
abortion context, which identifies the interest in potential life, and the adoption context, which 
centers on the interest in protecting the health and welfare of the child.  Courts have recognized 
that the interest in potential life is minimal before the fetus reaches viability when compared to a 
woman’s bodily privacy; however, in the context of embryo adoption, this interest is not 
insignificant because the state is involved in the placement of the embryo for gestation, not 
merely its general disposition.  While this interest in potential life alone may not be compelling, 
and, because the embryo is not a born child, the state interest in the welfare of the child is not yet 
actualized, these two interests considered together justify state approval and regulation of 
embryo adoption.  This dual analogy is appropriate to illustrate that the state has an interest in the 
potential life while the embryo is still developing, but should have a prophylactic interest in the 
future child’s best interests, because the embryo adoption arrangement has as its goal the birth of 
a child to genetically unrelated parents. 
 In traditional adoption, as with custody cases, the state has a strong interest in protecting 
the health and life of the child and thus places the child’s best interests first in any custodial 
decisions.178  Because states are often involved in adoptions, they have passed laws regulating 
adoption procedures to ensure proper screening of adoptive families out of a concern for the well 
being of the child that is being placed.179  By analogy, in embryo adoption, the state has an 
interest in the potential life because the agreement at issue is precisely one that controls custody 
of what will develop into a born child.  The agreement contemplates a born child as the result, 
and the state has an interest in ensuring that the resulting child, much as in traditional adoption, 
is placed with an appropriate family. 
                                                
178 Cynthia R. Mabry and Lisa Kelly, Adoption Law: Theory, Policy, and Practice (New York: 
William S. Hein & Co., 2010), 161. 
179 Mabry and Kelly, 160-61. 
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 By providing judicially supported permanence of the arrangement, embryo adoption 
would address and protect the interests of each of these parties.  As previously argued in chapter 
two, the use of contract law to govern embryo donation is not sufficient to prevent legal 
challenges to custody even after the agreement is executed and the child is born.  The legal 
vehicle state legislatures have chosen to allocate parental rights where there are no natural 
parents, or the natural parents have petitioned the court to relinquish parental rights, is adoption.  
It is only after the legal parents have died, or the court has terminated a parent’s parental rights, 
that the issue of temporary or permanent custody can be decided.180  It is through these 
procedures – termination of parental rights and adoption – that the parents and the child have 
finality in the decision that is made.  Under current regulations, which prohibit adoption before 
birth, although embryo donation contracts are often upheld in hindsight by courts, they are 
nevertheless contingent upon the parties’ cooperation after birth with any subsequent adoption 
requirements.  Allowing embryos to be adopted would eliminate this uncertainty, definitively 
naming the donee parents as the legal parents before implantation, and substantially protecting 
the adoptive parents from custody challenges after birth.181 
 Adoption would also protect the donors, who often wish to be involved in the process of 
finding an adoptive family.  For those who may believe that their embryos are their children, or 
who are concerned about the families who will raise what would be their biological children 
once they are born of the gestational mother, it may not be enough to sign a contract promising 
to relinquish future parental rights without the knowledge that the embryos will be given to what 
                                                
180 Mabry and Kelly, 17. 
181 Adoptions can be challenged on procedural or substantive grounds, such as a lack of adequate 
consent of the birth parents or the misrepresentation of a child’s medical history that affected the adoptive 
parents’ decision to adopt.  However, courts require challengers to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the “dissolution should be ordered on the ground presented and…would be in the child’s 
best interests.” Mabry and Kelly, 629. 
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they would consider to be a suitable family.  Although not all adoptions are facilitated by state 
agencies, state legislatures have established requirements for most adoptions, which include long 
applications, background checks, interviews, and a home assessment performed by a licensed 
social worker or other approved professional.182  These steps are in place to determine whether 
the prospective parents would be fit to adopt a child, which attempts to ensure the safety and well 
being of the child to be placed.  With this information, the court then makes a determination 
based on the best interests of the child being adopted about whether the adoptive parents should 
be allowed to adopt that child.183  Although the embryo is not a person, the gift of an embryo to a 
couple for purposes of gestation is a gift of potential parenthood: it is done with the intention that 
the recipients will become parents of the resulting child.  While implantation of the embryo does 
not guarantee that a pregnancy will produce a healthy viable child, the intent of the contract is to 
have the donated embryo gestated to term by the donee mother; therefore, the well being of that 
future child should be considered in the initial agreement to donate.  The procedures currently 
required for adoption of born children would therefore be both appropriate and beneficial for the 
parties involved in the donation, because they would reassure the donors that a suitable family 
will raise their genetic offspring, and abuses of the system that may result from a lack of 
oversight of donee families could be prevented. 
 Adoption could also address ancillary issues such as inheritance rights of the resulting 
child and issues of privacy relating to family genetic history that may be of concern to the 
donors.  In adoption of born children, inheritance is determined by statute, and the parties have 
the right to include provisions in the adoption agreement that determine whether they will 
maintain an open or closed adoption, allow access to the family medical history, and any other 
                                                
182 Mabry and Kelly, 152. 
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agreement the parties wish to make with respect to the raising of the adopted child.184  These 
same statutory definitions of the relationship of the parties to the resulting child and the ability to 
include provisions relating to the child’s life could be provided through adoption of embryos, 
giving donors more freedom in these arrangements and greater confidence in the legal 
relationships that may result. 
 The home assessment and background check requirements ancillary to adoption 
proceedings would also satisfy the state’s interest in potential life and the best interests of the 
future child in a similar way.  Inquiring into the adoptive family’s history and lifestyle would 
ensure that the child resulting from the donation would be placed in a home that would be in his 
or her best interest.  Courts also would not be left to look back at the contract to determine 
parentage if the donor family challenges custody, because custody and parental rights would be 
judicially declared from the beginning, minimizing the emotional toll on both the donor and 
donee families, as well as the child that may be born of the arrangement.  This would not 
preclude courts from looking back to the terms of the adoption to determine issues ancillary to 
the adoption, such as whether the adoptee or the adoptive parents are entitled to the child’s 
medical or family history. 
 The state could further protect the potential life and the best interests of the future child 
by addressing practical issues, such as guardianship of the embryos where the original custodians 
cannot be found or have relinquished the embryos, and limits on the number of embryos that 
may be adopted at one time.  It may be prudent to establish a neutral third party as the guardian 
of embryos available for adoption to prevent a conflict of interest from arising if the physician 
who stands to gain from performing an embryo transfer in embryo adoption is responsible for 
                                                
184 Mabry and Kelly, 503-19. 
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protecting the rights of that embryo.  It may also be advisable for states or private agencies to 
place a limit on the number of embryos that may be adopted at one time based on standards of 
reproductive medicine, because implantation of more than one embryo may pose a risk to the 
developing fetuses, which would stand in contrast to one of the purposes of embryo adoption, 
which is to protect the best interests of the developing child.185  Such provisions, however, should 
be left to state legislatures to determine based on the reproductive practices in the jurisdiction 
and the construction of the embryo adoption laws. 
 A prospective judicial determination of parentage through adoption would also establish 
the kind of permanence that contract law does not provide in reproductive arrangements.  Under 
contract regulation, reproductive agreements could be challenged based on allegations of fraud, 
coercion, or another legal basis, allowing for legal remedies that are not appropriate in the 
context of embryo donation.  Although adoptions can also be challenged on similar grounds and 
subsequently dissolved, “Courts are reluctant to dissolve a final adoption decree,” and will only 
do so after “extraordinary circumstances or unusual facts” are established.186,187  This high 
burden, as well as the safeguards such as a background check and home study that are performed 
before the adoption could be permitted, would afford greater protection to the adoptive parents of 
an embryo against legal challenges than contract law could.  Once the court has terminated the 
parental rights of the original parents and invested the adoptive parents with full parental rights 
and custody, it is rare that there would be a challenge to the validity of the proceeding for either 
party involved.188  The length and complexity of the proceeding ensures that both parties 
understand fully the rights at issue, and not only are the donors more protected from fraud, but 
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also the donees have greater protection from future legal challenges to their custody.  Allowing 
embryos to be adopted instead of donated by contract would reassure both the donors and the 
donees that their agreement is valid and permanent. 
 
2. Does Not Affect Reproductive Rights 
 
 
Allowing embryos to be adopted instead of donated would not have a negative impact on 
constitutionally protected privacy issues.  It is possible for states to apply the adoption paradigm 
without commenting on the moral status of the embryo, as has been demonstrated in 
Louisiana.189  Although Louisiana’s system of law is unique due to its roots in the French legal 
system, the same concepts can be translated into the English-based system used throughout the 
country.  Also, while this proposed system of embryo adoption uses the juridical person 
framework to explain how adoption can govern embryo donation, this designation is not 
necessary as long as the principles adopted are substantially similar and afford the same legal 
rights and protections to the embryo to be adopted. 
 In Louisiana, cryogenically preserved embryos are termed “juridical persons” while they 
remain outside of the uterus, which provides them with some of the legal protections accorded to 
born persons without elevating them to a “full personhood” status.190  The concept of the juridical 
person is most commonly applied to corporations, which exist as an individual entity, a “fictional 
person” for purposes of legal reasoning, which may sue and be sued.191  Also known as an 
artificial person or legal person, this “entity is a person for purposes of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses but is not a citizen for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities 
                                                
189 Louisiana Revised Statutes, sec. 9:123 (2011). 
190 Louisiana Revised Statutes, sec. 9:123 (2011). 
191 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 
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Clauses.”192  While it is clear that a corporation is not a natural person,193 it is necessary to treat it 
as an individual for continuity of the business and for other legal reasons relating to litigation and 
protection of shareholders.  This designation as juridical person does not confer full rights of 
personhood on a corporation, nor would it do so for an embryo.  In the Louisiana embryo 
adoption law, the embryo as a juridical person is only a “person” insofar as it can be the subject 
of an adoption proceeding before implantation; it loses this status once the adoption is 
complete.194 
 Just as a corporation can be dissolved and no longer exist as a juridical person, the legal 
custodians of an embryo would still retain the right to discard or donate their embryo for 
research.  The juridical person designation is meant to facilitate the legal mechanism of adoption, 
not to remove already-existing rights.  For this reason, allowing the embryo to be adopted under 
this framework would not prohibit the progenitors’ right to discard their embryos; it merely 
strengthens the legal foundation of one of the many options available to custodians of frozen 
embryos.  Although states may exercise the option of prohibiting certain dispositions such as 
donation for research, the juridical or artificial person status does not require nor entail that 
legislative action. 
 Also, just as the designation does not affect the options for disposition of frozen embryos, 
it also would not affect reproductive privacy rights such as abortion, either for the adoptive 
mother in embryo adoption or any woman pregnant by other means.  Although the state has an 
interest in potential life, this interest is only significant when the state is involved in the 
placement of the potential life, as in embryo adoption, or when the fetus has reached viability, as 
                                                
192 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. 
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in cases of elective late-term abortion.  Conferring the status of juridical person on the frozen 
embryo to allow for pre-birth adoption does not confer full rights of personhood, and therefore 
does not increase the state’s interest in potential life that has been explained in reproductive 
jurisprudence.195   
 This mechanism of embryo donation would apply only during the adoption proceeding, 
and the “juridical person” or other similar designation would no longer apply once the adoption 
was complete.  If the new adoptive custodians subsequently implant the embryo, it would be 
treated as if naturally conceived, and therefore all of the rights available to a woman who became 
pregnant by any other means would apply to the woman pregnant by embryo adoption.  Even 
though she “adopted” the embryo, she would retain the right to have an abortion, because the 
purpose of the adoption proceedings is to ensure that if the child were carried to term, it would 
be raised by suitable parents, and those parents could be secure in knowing their custody will not 
likely be challenged.  The apparent inconsistency that may exist in requiring an adoption of an 
embryo, but later permitting an abortion, may be resolved through this understanding that the 
adoption is procedural and intended to protect parental rights, not to redefine the moral status of 
the embryo or afford the embryo greater protection than embryos conceived through sexual 
intercourse.  The purpose is not to abrogate the traditional rights of pregnant women based on a 
particular reproductive arrangement.  Therefore, allowing adoption of frozen embryos would not 
affect current reproductive liberties nor change the options available to those wishing to discard 
or donate their embryos. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
195 See Roe v. Wade; Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
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B. EMBRYO ADOPTION IN THE CHURCH 
 
 
The Catholic Church may be reluctant to recognize embryo adoption as a morally permissible 
practice because it does not want to lose ground on its strong teaching against many reproductive 
technologies that it considers to be offensive to human sexuality and the marital act.196  The 
Church has emphasized that technologies aimed at overcoming infertility by circumventing the 
marital act are illicit despite their “understandable motivations.”197  Dignitas Personae assumed 
in its discussion of embryo donation that this practice is another treatment of infertility, and thus 
illicit for the same reasons as heterologous IVF and gestational surrogacy.198  However, this 
analysis examines the practice from a technological perspective instead of a human life-based 
perspective.  As it was argued in chapter three, the act of embryo transfer is not per se illicit; 
therefore, the morality of the act depends on its circumstances.  However, if the Church views 
the practice through the lens of adoption instead of reproductive technologies, separating the act 
of conception from the act of implantation, then embryo adoption and subsequent implantation 
offers a method of saving embryonic life without contradicting Catholic teaching on marriage 
and reproduction. 
 
1. Ethical Analogy to Born Adoption 
 
 
Donum Vitae states, “From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be 
respected in an absolute way.”199 For the Church, the embryo is a child, with all of the rights of 
personhood afforded to born individuals.  Personhood is to be respected at all stages of 
development, from conception to natural death; this requires not only provision of basic human 
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needs, but also the protection of life itself.200  This is recognized in the Church’s approval of 
adoption of born children and its recognition of the generosity shown by those who choose to do 
so.201  The Church even facilitates adoptions around the world through its affiliation with 
Catholic Charities, an organization of charities that includes a private adoption agency.202  The 
Church encourages this gift of family, which provides children with a family that will ensure that 
their basic human needs are met and that provides an environment in which adopted children 
have an opportunity to flourish.203   
 If the embryo is a person according to the Church, equal in dignity and status to a born 
child, then adoption of the child at the embryonic stage should not differ ethically from adoption 
of a child after birth.  Although the technical needs of the child at the embryonic stage, which 
include attachment to the mother in pregnancy, are vastly different than those required after 
birth, the basic human needs remain the same: nutrition, shelter, hydration, etc.  Furthermore, the 
intentions of the parties involved are also the same: one set of parents wishes to relinquish 
parental rights, while another set wish to accept parental duties and rights and raise the child as 
their own.  According to the Church’s own teaching, a person is a person whether he or she is an 
embryo or a born child; when a child or an embryo is in need of a family, the stage of 
development should not determine whether a couple is ethically permitted to provide one. 
 Viewing embryo donation as a form of adoption also addresses the issue of husband and 
wife becoming parents only through one another in the marital act.  In adoption, man and woman 
become parents through their mutual consent to welcome a child into their family as their own.  
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Although they do not become genetic parents through the marital act, they become adoptive 
parents by agreeing to become the parents of a child in need of a home.  Unlike IVF and artificial 
insemination, where the child is conceived outside of the marital act and the spouses become 
parents through technology instead of one another, in embryo adoption the spouses become 
parents through their mutual consent to parent the child that already exists as an embryo.204  The 
effect of embryo adoption is not procreation without sexual intercourse, but a true adoption of, 
according to the Church, a child, albeit an adoption that simply requires more technical care than 
adoption of a born child.  The fact that a woman must become pregnant outside of the marital act 
in embryo adoption does not mean she “becomes a parent” without her spouse; on the contrary, it 
is their mutual consent to parent a child, along with the woman’s willingness to undergo 
pregnancy to care for their adopted child for the first nine months, that makes both husband and 
wife parents together, at the same time. 
 
 
 
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ADOPTION APPROACH 
 
 
Although this proposal seems to satisfy the shortcomings in the law and the ethical uncertainty in 
the Catholic Church, it is not without its potential consequences.  For the law, the language of 
adoption can be emotionally charged when applied to embryos, and although it was previously 
argued that embryo donation is not complicit in IVF, nevertheless the acceptance of embryo 
adoption by the Church may still be seen as tacit approval of IVF and other reproductive 
                                                
204 It is important for this argument that the embryo has already been created.  The Church teaches 
that fertilization outside of the marital act is illicit; therefore, if spouses give their mutual consent to 
become parents of an embryo that has not yet been created, they do not “adopt” the child, but engage in 
the illicit act of artificial procreation. 
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technologies.  However, these possible effects of applying the adoption framework to embryo 
donation will likely be minor, and easily overcome by clarification of the scope of the practice. 
 
1. Legal Implications 
 
 
The reproductive rights cases establishing the legality of birth control and abortion were careful 
to avoid making a determination of personhood for an embryo or fetus and instead only 
reaffirmed that the embryo or fetus does not have the rights accorded to born persons in our legal 
system.205  To maintain legal access to abortion, legislatures and courts have also avoided 
language that implies personhood of the unborn, especially in reference to embryos in 
reproductive technologies. 206  Terms such as “custody,” “adoption,” and even “child” have been 
avoided in this field because they suggest the embryo should be treated as a born child, who may 
be adopted or the subject of a custody dispute.  The use of adoption to regulate embryo donation 
may cause concern among proponents of certain reproductive rights, such as abortion, because it 
is currently understood to apply to born persons.  Calling the transfer of an embryo an 
“adoption” could lead to confusion about the legal and moral status of the embryo in light of a 
comparison between born adoption and embryo adoption. 
 Although this objection may be valid, it can be overcome by an express declaration by 
the legislature on the narrow application of the adoption framework in the context of embryo 
donation.  It is possible to make it clear in the regulations that this “juridical person” is a legal 
fiction intended to circumvent the legal pitfalls of transferring embryos merely by contract law, 
not to confer rights of personhood.  It is true that adoption most often refers to the permanent 
transfer of custody of a born person, but colloquially the term is also used to refer to the purchase 
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of pets.  It is not the language of adoption that confers the rights of personhood, but the content 
of the law. 
 The language of adoption may also impact the debate over the ethical permissibility of 
embryonic stem cell research, which entails the destruction of the embryo for scientific purposes.  
While the embryo is still not legally considered a person, if embryo adoption is legally instituted, 
it may lead to a perceived inconsistency in the treatment of embryos.  Although the morality of 
embryonic stem cell research is outside the scope of this project, it does not appear that embryo 
adoption will affect this practice.  Some may argue that it is incoherent to allow the same 
embryos that are up for “adoption” to be taken apart for medical research.  However, the same 
could be said for the criminal statutes that identify the killing of a fetus as murder, but only if it 
is done without the permission of the pregnant woman, and by a person who is not licensed to 
perform abortions.  The moral status of the fetus does not change, but the law allows for a 
difference in the way it is treated.  Likewise, the legal “change” in status of the cryopreserved 
embryo does not heighten its moral status, but is meant only to strengthen the process by which 
the embryo may be donated to another individual.  It does not say that the embryo is a person 
when it is to be adopted, but not a person when it is to be donated for research; instead, it 
provides the legal basis for a permanent transfer of future parental rights when an individual 
wishes to gestate and raise the resulting child, while making no comment on the availability of 
other options for frozen embryos such as donation for research. 
 Finally, treating a pregnancy that results from embryo adoption the same as a naturally 
conceived pregnancy raises questions about the usefulness of the adoption framework after 
implantation.  In traditional adoption, the adoption agency often visits the adoptive family at 
certain intervals after the adoption is finalized to evaluate the success of the placement and 
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ensure the adopted child is not in an abusive or otherwise harmful situation.207  Although parents 
of children born from natural conception are not subject to these parental evaluations, and after 
implantation the adoptive parents are considered the natural parents of the resulting child, this 
treatment as if naturally conceived does not preclude agency follow-up because it is intended 
only to preserve constitutionally-protected rights.  The purpose of embryo adoption is to provide 
an embryo with the potential to develop when it otherwise would not have the opportunity.  
Where the state steps in to ensure the provision of this potential through allowing and regulating 
embryo adoption, it should also have the right to monitor the maintenance of that potential after 
birth.  While these follow-up visits may not be necessary for embryo adoption, states may want 
to consider some process through which the safety and well being of children who are the result 
of embryo adoption can be verified, both for reasons of child protection and monitoring the 
outcomes of the embryo adoption process itself. 
 
2. Catholic Considerations 
 
 
Using the adoption framework to justify the morality of embryo donation in Catholic bioethics 
may be viewed as the Church’s conditional approval of IVF, the procedure that yields the 
embryos that would be available for adoption, even if embryo adoption does not cooperate in the 
process.  By providing an ethical option for custodians of frozen embryos, the Church may 
appear to condone not only the disposition of the embryo, but also the process by which the 
embryo is formed.  From the Church’s perspective, this could “result in scandal208 by apparently 
legitimizing IVF,” potentially leading others to believe that the practice of IVF is morally 
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permissible in Catholic teaching.209  It could also facilitate less responsible IVF practices, 
encouraging participants in IVF to fertilize more ova because it would be ethically permissible 
for these individuals to donate any unused embryos to others. 
 However, embryo adoption should not be viewed as a stumbling block for Catholic 
bioethical teaching, but as an ethical remedy for a seemingly impossible situation.  If the Church 
allows embryo adoption as a solution to the problem of abandoned embryos, it can still continue 
to teach its doctrine that the process of creating the embryos is illicit.  Just as the Church 
condemns acts of rape but protects any pregnancy that may result, the Church can continue to 
condemn the practice of IVF while protecting the embryo that was already created.  By 
articulating a clear teaching that permitting embryo adoption is not a passive approval of IVF 
and other illicit reproductive technologies according to Catholic bioethics, the Church can avoid 
the appearance of inconsistent teaching. 
 The preservation of the right to abort the adopted embryo in this conceptualization of an 
embryo adoption framework is also inconsistent with Catholic teaching, but according to the 
legal landscape of the United States, is not a right that may be constrained regardless of the 
method used to achieve pregnancy.  The Church may nevertheless approve embryo adoption 
while maintaining the impermissibility of abortion, because although abortion is a legal right, it 
is not necessary to embryo adoption, and therefore is a separate moral issue that does not impact 
the morality of embryo adoption. 
                                                
209 Brandon P. Brown and Jason T. Eberl, “Ethical Considerations in Defense of Embryo 
Adoption,” in The Ethics of Embryo Adoption and the Catholic Tradition: Moral Arguments, Economic 
Reality and Social Analysis, eds. Sarah-Vaughan Brakman and Darlene Fozard Weaver (Springer Science 
+ Business Media B.V., 2007), 113. 
 66 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Although there are still other options for custodians of embryos who no longer want them, those 
who choose embryo adoption should have the proper legal and ethical protections to safeguard 
the transfer.  While the intention of this paper is not to integrate Catholic teaching with the law, it 
is possible to reconcile the difficulties that exist with embryo donation in each separate tradition 
through the implementation of embryo adoption.  The benefits of instituting this framework far 
outweigh the potential pitfalls, and both the donor and donee families would be better served by 
having a clearer and stronger legal and ethical structure.   
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